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I like the price ceiling and floor approach but see two issues with it. If we’re selling a DAO token with equal voting rights, and a majority is required to make some decision, then someone could come in and purchase the equivalent of the token’s market cap + ε. They would then be able to make an authoritative decision. If they choose to sell the tokens after the decision had been made, they’d have effectively paid (market cap + ε -num_tokens_purchase * price_floor) to make that decision. From the point of view of an investor, being paid by the beneficiaries is great for a company like Apple that pays dividends. However, if the company/beneficiary can make better use of their income by reinvesting it rather than paying it out to the token/share holders, then price appreciate of the token/share is how that value gets realized. Amazon is a great example of this. In the safe token model, the role of price appreciation would be determined by the sale administrator rather than market forces, which seems kind of odd…